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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 The government brings this appeal challenging the 
District Court‟s ruling that a prior conviction for wearing 
body armor while committing a felony in violation of 11 Del. 
C. § 1449(a) is not a predicate offense under the Armed 
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Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  We 
hold that the body armor conviction is an ACCA predicate 
offense because it involved the possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute.  It is “a serious drug offense.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1).  We will vacate the ruling of the District Court 
and remand for sentencing in conformity with this opinion. 
I. 
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon 
to possess a firearm.  A person convicted under this section is 
subject to a fifteen-year sentence-enhancement provision: 
(1) In the case of a person who violates section 
922(g) of this title and has three previous 
convictions by any court referred to in section 
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a 
serious drug offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one another, such 
person shall be fined under this title and 
imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant 
a probationary sentence to, such person with 
respect to the conviction under section 922(g). 
(2) As used in this subsection-- 
(A) the term “serious drug offense” 
means-- 
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(i) an offense under the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled 
Substances Import and Export Act 
(21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 
705 of title 46, for which a 
maximum term of imprisonment 
of ten years or more is prescribed 
by law; or 
(ii) an offense under State law, 
involving manufacturing, 
distributing, or possessing with 
intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance 
(as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 802)), for which a 
maximum term of imprisonment 
of ten years or more is prescribed 
by law; 
(B) the term “violent felony” means any 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, or any act of 
juvenile delinquency involving the use or 
carrying of a firearm, knife, or 
destructive device that would be 
punishable by imprisonment for such 
term if committed by an adult, that-- 
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(i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the 
person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to 
another; . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
Leonard Gibbs was arrested for violating the 
conditions of his probation.  In the course of arrest, the police 
discovered a loaded .357 caliber revolver with ammunition.  
He was charged with two counts: knowing possession of a 
firearm and knowing possession of ammunition after having 
been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).  Gibbs pled guilty to the 
firearm count pursuant to a plea agreement, which stated that 
“[t]he maximum penalties for this offense are 10 years [of] 
imprisonment” and that the government agreed to move to 
dismiss the ammunition count.  The District Court accepted 
Gibbs‟ guilty plea. 
 After the guilty plea but before Gibbs‟ sentencing, the 
government changed its position.  The government explained 
that, after reviewing the pleadings from Gibbs‟ previous 
convictions, it concluded that Gibbs had three prior felonies 
meeting the requirements for an enhancement under the 
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ACCA.  By the government‟s count, the three § 924(e) 
“violent felony or a serious drug offense” convictions 
included a 2003 conviction for “aggravated menacing,” a 
2004 conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine, 
and a 2007 conviction in Delaware state court for wearing 
body armor while committing a felony.  There was no dispute 
that the first two convictions are ACCA predicate offenses, 
but the government changed its position with respect to the 
2007 conviction. 
The government argued that wearing body armor while 
committing a felony was a serious drug offense under 
§ 924(e) because the underlying felony was possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine.  After Gibbs‟ guilty plea but 
before the sentencing hearing, the government informed 
Gibbs in a letter of its revised position.  No longer did the 
government subscribe to its view in the plea agreement that 
“[t]he maximum penalties for this offense are 10 years [of] 
imprisonment.”  As a result, the government stated, it would 
not oppose a motion by Gibbs to withdraw his guilty plea 
before sentencing.  But if Gibbs wished to proceed, the 
government would argue for the imposition of an enhanced 
sentence under the ACCA.  Gibbs decided to proceed to 
sentencing, where he would argue that the body armor 
conviction was not an ACCA predicate offense. 
At the sentencing hearing, the government argued that 
the District Court must take a closer look at Gibbs‟ 2007 
conviction.  The indictment charged him with two counts.  
The first stated that Gibbs “did knowingly wear body armor 
during the commission of a felony, Possession with Intent to 
Deliver Cocaine, as set forth in Count II of this indictment 
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which is incorporated herein by reference.”  (App. at 28.)  
Count II charged that Gibbs “did knowingly and unlawfully 
possess Cocaine . . . with the intent to deliver same,” in 
violation of 16 Del. C. § 4751.  (Id. at 28-29.)  Gibbs pled 
guilty to the first count but not the second.  In doing so, he 
engaged in the following colloquy: 
The Court: You are charged that on or about the 
21st day of October 2006, in the County of New 
Castle, State of Delaware, you did knowingly 
wear body armor during the commission of a 
felony, the felony being Possession with Intent 
to Deliver Cocaine, in violation of Title 11 of 
the Delaware Code.  Do you understand the 
crime as I‟ve read it to you? 
The Defendant: Yes, ma‟am. 
The Court: And how do you plead? 
The Defendant: Guilty. 
(Id. at 51-52.)  The government argued that, though Gibbs 
was not convicted of the drug charge, the body armor 
conviction was a serious drug offense. 
 After considering the government‟s changed position, 
the probation office released a revised presentence report 
concluding that Gibbs was not subject to an ACCA 
enhancement.  The government objected, and the District 
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Court ruled in Gibbs‟ favor.1  The Court stated that it could 
only look to the text of the statute and the fact of conviction.  
The Delaware body armor statute proscribes a person from 
“wear[ing] body armor during the commission of a felony.”  
11 Del. C. § 1449.  The statute does not limit the underlying 
“felony” to drug-related felonies.  The District Court 
concluded that “the substantive content of [Delaware‟s body 
armor statute] does not qualify it as a serious drug crime 
under the ACCA,” (app. at 71) and held that Gibbs was not 
subject to the § 924(e) enhancement.  The Court sentenced 
Gibbs to 72 months‟ imprisonment, and the government 
timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  We review the District Court‟s 
denial of the ACCA enhancement de novo because the 
government‟s appeal raises a pure question of law.  United 
States v. Henton, 374 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 690-91 (3d Cir. 2003). 
III. 
 The government appeals the District Court‟s ruling 
that Gibbs‟ state body armor conviction is not an ACCA 
                                                 
1
 Gibbs objected that an ACCA enhancement was 
inconsistent with the terms of the plea agreement.  The 
District Court did not rule on this objection because it held 
that the enhancement did not apply. 
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predicate offense.  We start with the text of the ACCA.  A 
state conviction qualifies as “a serious drug offense” if it is an 
offense “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing 
with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term 
of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”  
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  There is no dispute that Gibbs‟ 
body armor conviction carried a maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years or more, see 11 Del. C. §§ 1449 
and 4205(b)(2) (carrying a statutory maximum of 25 years 
imprisonment).  The issue is whether the body armor 
conviction “involv[ed]” manufacturing, distributing, or 
possessing, with intent to manufacture or distribute, a 
controlled substance. 
 Congress‟s use of the term “involving” expands the 
meaning of a serious drug offense beyond the simple offenses 
of manufacturing, distributing, and possessing a controlled 
substance.  See, e.g., United States v. James, 834 F.2d 92, 93 
(4th Cir. 1987) (stating that “violations „involving‟ the 
distribution, manufacture, or importation of controlled 
substances must be read as including more than merely 
crimes of distribution, manufacturing, and importation 
themselves”).  The plain meaning of “involve” is “to relate 
closely” or to “connect closely.”  United States v. McKenney, 
450 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Webster‟s Third New 
International Dictionary 1191 (1993) and The American 
Heritage Dictionary 921 (4th ed. 2000), respectively).  The 
definition of a serious drug offense should be construed to 
extend “§ 924(e) beyond the precise offenses of distributing, 
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manufacturing, or possessing, and as encompassing as well 
offenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”  
United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003).  In 
adopting this position, we conform with all courts of appeals 
that have addressed the scope of the definition of a serious 
drug offense.  See United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 365 
(5th Cir. 2008); McKenney, 450 F.3d at 42; United States v. 
Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2003); King, 325 
F.3d at 113; United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 191 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
 Gibbs argues that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), defining the state 
offenses that are serious drug crimes, should be interpreted in 
light of § 924(e)(2)(A)(i), defining the federal offenses that 
are serious drug crimes.  Section 924(e)(2)(A)(i) defines 
serious federal drug offenses by reference to three statutes: 
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 951 et seq.; and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 
46 U.S.C. § 7501-70508.  Gibbs argues that the definition of 
state serious drug offenses should be limited to the types of 
crimes identified by the three federal statutes.  In other words, 
Gibbs argues that subsection (ii) cannot include a broader 
range of offenses than subsection (i). 
 While both subsections relate to the same subject, 
there is no reason to think that subsection (i) should limit our 
construction of subsection (ii).  If Congress wished to do this, 
it could have done so.  In the federal “three strikes” law, 18 
U.S.C. § 3559(c), Congress limited the definition of serious 
state drug crimes by defining it as, “an offense under State 
law that, had the offense been prosecuted in a court of the 
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United States, would have been punishable under section 
401(b)(1)(A) or 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 848) or section 1010(b)(1)(A) of the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 
960(b)(1)(A)).”  18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(H)(ii).  Congress 
explicitly limited the serious state drug offenses to the serious 
federal drug offenses.  The ACCA did not take this approach.  
Instead, Congress used broad terminology – “involving” – to 
define the category of serious state drug offenses without 
limiting its scope to federal statutes.  This means that 
Congress did not wish subsection (ii) to be limited to the 
same set of crimes listed in subsection (i). 
 Congress adopted a broad interpretation of “a serious 
drug offense” because it intended to define an “entire class of 
state offenses „involving‟ certain activities, namely, 
„manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 
manufacture or distribute‟ a controlled substance.”  
Alexander, 331 F.3d at 131 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)).  Congress did not point to specific 
statutes as it did in defining serious federal drug crimes by 
enumerating “the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 
et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 
U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(i).  Each state has different serious drug 
crimes and different definitions for similar crimes.  Thus, 
Congress relied upon general language referencing the entire 
class of serious state drug offenses. 
 Congress used the term “involving” to carve the class 
of serious state drug crimes broadly.  But there are of course 
limits to how wide we can construe this class.  As the First 
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Circuit noted, “[n]ot all offenses bearing any sort of 
relationship with drug manufacturing, distribution, or 
possession with intent to manufacture or distribute will 
qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA.  The relationship 
must not be too remote or tangential.”  McKenney, 450 F.3d 
at 45.  We must therefore determine whether Gibbs‟ body 
armor conviction is related to or connected with 
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing, with intent to 
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance or if it is too 
remote or tangential. 
 Of critical importance is what approach we take to this 
question.  The District Court held that it could only examine 
the Delaware statute and the fact of conviction, thereby 
precluding an examination of the underlying indictment and 
plea colloquy.  The government argues that we should adopt 
an approach that allows us to look to the underlying 
indictment and plea colloquy.  The former approach has been 
termed the “formal categorical approach” and the latter the 
“modified categorical approach.”  Before we proceed, we 
must determine which approach is applicable in this case. 
 The ACCA generally requires that the sentencing court 
look only to the fact of conviction and not to the facts 
underlying the conviction.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575, 600 (1990).  “Under the categorical approach, we must 
look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and 
may not consider other evidence concerning the defendant‟s 
prior crimes, including, the particular facts underlying a 
conviction.”  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 
2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  This 
interpretation derives from the language of § 924(e), which 
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refers only to “a person who . . . has three previous 
convictions,” not to “a person who has committed[ ]three 
previous violent felonies or drug offenses.”  Taylor, 495 U.S. 
at 600 (emphasis added).  The ACCA “most likely refers to 
the elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of 
each defendant‟s conduct.”  Id. 
 Such a reading of the ACCA makes sense.  Congress 
wished to avoid an approach allowing an examination of the 
underlying facts that “could force sentencing courts to hold 
mini-trials, hear evidence and witnesses and otherwise engage 
in a detailed examination of specific facts involved in the 
prior offense.”  United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 86 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1990).  “If Congress had meant to adopt an approach 
that would require the sentencing court to engage in an 
elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant‟s prior 
offenses, surely this would have been mentioned somewhere 
in the legislative history.”  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.  At the 
same time, there are occasions where a court must look 
beyond the mere fact of conviction and the statute at issue.  
For instance, “[s]tatutes phrased in the disjunctive may invite 
inquiry into the record of conviction if it is unclear from the 
face of the statute whether the conviction [is a qualifying 
offense].”  Garcia, 462 F.3d at 292. 
 In recognition of the need to look beyond the mere fact 
of conviction in some cases, the Supreme Court developed 
the modified categorical approach to allow sentencing courts 
to look at the indictment or information and the jury 
instructions.  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.  The approach was 
adopted in the context of determining whether a state burglary 
conviction constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA.  
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The simple fact of conviction may not provide enough 
information to determine whether a state burglary conviction 
is a predicate ACCA offense.  Thus, the Court adopted a 
modified categorical approach for the “narrow range of cases 
where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of 
generic burglary.”  Id.  These cases invite departure to 
determine which elements the jury had to find to convict 
someone of burglary. 
For example, in a State whose burglary statutes 
include entry of an automobile as well as a 
building, if the indictment or information and 
jury instructions show that the defendant was 
charged only with a burglary of a building, and 
that jury necessarily had to find an entry of a 
building to convict, then the Government 
should be allowed to use the conviction for 
enhancement. 
Id. 
 The modified categorical approach is not limited to 
prior violent felonies but also applies to determine whether a 
prior conviction was a serious drug offense.  See Vickers, 540 
F.3d at 364; Brandon, 247 F.3d at 188.  In other words, the 
modified categorical approach applies broadly in the context 
of § 924(e).  See United States v. Bregnard, 951 F.2d 457, 
459 (1st Cir. 1991).  Where a statute‟s language is ambiguous 
or disjunctive and, as a result, violation of the statute may and 
may not constitute an ACCA predicate offense, then the court 
may look to the indictment or jury instructions to determine 
which elements had to be proven to support a conviction.  See 
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Shephard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005) (stating 
that a court can look to the charging documents and “recorded 
judicial acts,” like jury instructions, under the modified 
categorical approach).  The modified categorical approach is 
limited to this “narrow range of cases.”  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
602.  In Brandon, the Fourth Circuit stated, 
[The modified categorical approach] applies in 
cases where the state statute can be violated in 
several different ways, some of which would 
support enhancement under 924(e) and some of 
which would not.  In those cases, the sentencing 
court may examine the indictment, other 
charging papers, or jury instructions to 
determine whether the defendant was charged 
with a crime that meets the requirements of 
section 924(e). 
247 F.3d at 188.  It is appropriate for us to apply the modified 
categorical approach in this case if the statute of conviction is 
ambiguous or disjunctive, thereby inviting inquiry into 
whether the conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense 
pursuant to § 924(e). 
 The Delaware body armor statute “can be violated in 
several different ways.”  Id.  The statute merely proscribes a 
person from wearing body armor “during the commission of a 
felony,” 11 Del. C. § 1449, but it leaves the underlying felony 
undefined.  This use of the word “felony” incorporates by 
reference the disjunctive list of all felonies.  We cannot 
determine from the face of the statute alone whether a 
violation is an ACCA predicate offense but must look to the 
 16 
underlying facts of the conviction to determine if it is a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense.  If the underlying 
felony was burglary, a violation of the body armor statute 
may constitute a violent felony.  Likewise, if the underlying 
felony was manufacturing, distributing, or possessing a 
controlled substance, this may constitute a serious drug 
offense.  In order to determine whether the body armor 
conviction is an ACCA predicate offense, one must look to 
the charging instrument or jury instructions.  Applying the 
modified categorical approach in this context does not entail 
an “elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant‟s 
prior offenses,” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, and it does not 
“force sentencing courts to hold mini-trials.”  Preston, 910 
F.2d at 86 n.3.  All the approach requires is a determination of 
what the underlying felony was that the defendant committed 
while wearing body armor.  Just as one must examine the 
indictment and jury instructions to determine if a state 
burglary conviction is an ACCA predicate offense, one must 
examine the indictment to determine if Gibbs‟ body armor 
conviction is an ACCA predicate offense.  As such, the 
modified categorical approach should be applied in this case. 
 Under the modified categorical approach, we examine 
the indictment to find that the body armor charge states that 
Gibbs “did knowingly wear body armor during the 
commission of a felony, Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Cocaine, as set forth in Count II of this indictment which is 
incorporated herein by reference.”  (App. at 28.)  We must 
determine whether Gibbs‟ offense as stated in the indictment 
meets the ACCA‟s definition of a serious drug offense.  The 
question then becomes whether wearing body armor while 
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committing a felony, where that felony is possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute, is related to or connected 
with “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), or if it is too remote or tangential. 
 To determine whether a conviction is related to or 
connected with the particular conduct of manufacturing, 
distributing, or possessing a controlled substance, “courts 
follow the approach outlined in Taylor and ask whether the 
proscribed conduct is an inherent part or result of the generic 
crime of conviction . . . or, stated somewhat differently, 
whether the abstract crime intrinsically involves the 
proscribed conduct.”  Brandon, 247 F.3d at 191.  Here, we 
must examine whether manufacturing, distributing, or 
possessing, with intent to manufacture or possess, a 
controlled substance is “an inherent part or result of the 
generic crime” of wearing body armor while committing a 
felony, where that felony is possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine.  Id.  We find that it is both. 
 First, the underlying felony is an inherent part of the 
offense of wearing body armor while committing a felony 
because the underlying felony must be proven in order to be 
guilty of the body armor offense.  While it is true that the 
defendant need not be convicted of a drug offense, a person 
convicted under 11 Del. C. § 1449 has to be found guilty of 
some underlying felony.  And where, as in this case, the 
felony is a drug crime, proof of the elements of a drug offense 
is required.  See Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 581 (Del. 
2005) (construing an analogous statute proscribing 
“possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony”).  
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In pleading guilty to the body armor offense, Gibbs pled 
guilty to the elements of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine.  Second, wearing body armor serves to promote and 
advance the underlying drug crime.  The underlying felony is 
a result or effect of the proscribed conduct because wearing 
body armor makes it more likely that a felony will occur.  
Where the underlying felony is a drug crime, wearing body 
armor while committing a felony serves to promote and 
advance the drug crime.  This establishes that a serious drug 
offense “is inherent in the generic conduct proscribed by the 
statute and alleged in the indictment underlying” Gibbs‟ 
conviction.  Id. at 191-92.  We, therefore, conclude that 
Gibbs‟ body armor conviction is a serious drug offense under 
the ACCA. 
 Gibbs argues that this interpretation of “a serious drug 
offense” raises a constitutional problem of fair notice.  But 
our case law holds that a statute “violates due process of law 
if it „either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily 
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.‟”  
United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854, 862 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)).  The ACCA does not “forbid[] or require[] the doing 
of an act.”  It is a sentencing law and does not proscribe any 
conduct.  See United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 331 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“The ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute 
and does not create a separate offense.”).  Regardless, 
interpreting “serious drug offense[s]” to include the Delaware 
body armor conviction is hardly vague.  Gibbs‟ offense was 
wearing body armor while possessing with intent to distribute 
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a controlled substance.  It is not so vague or unexpected and 
does not betray fair notice to find that such an offense 
“involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with 
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”  
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
IV. 
 We hold that Gibbs‟ body armor conviction is an 
ACCA predicate offense.  The government argues that we 
need not remand to the District Court for a determination of 
whether the ACCA enhancement is in conformity with the 
terms of Gibbs‟ plea agreement.  We disagree and believe 
there are material issues of fact that the District Court must 
resolve.  For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and 
remand to the District Court to rule on Gibbs‟ outstanding 
objection to the ACCA enhancement. 
